Controlled laboratory experiments have become a generally accepted method for studying economic behavior, but there are two issues regarding the reliability of such work. The first pertains to the ability to generalize experimental results outside the laboratory. The second pertains to the impact the payment procedure has on observed behavior. This paper adds empirical insight into both issues. Using data from the promotional campaign of a bank and a laboratory experiment that closely mimics the same decision, we find similar levels of risk taking controlling for gender and age. We also compare behavior on this same risky choice across three distinct experimental payoff procedures: a single salient choice as in the field, multiple responses for similar choices with one selected at random for payment, and a single salient choice that has only a small probability of being implemented. We find nearly identical behavior across these three payment procedures.
Introduction
Since almost every economic decision involves risk, it is unsurprising that numerous researchers have attempted to measure risk attitudes of individuals. Unfortunately, empirical work is often plagued by important parameters, such as the probability of an outcome or its associated payoff to the decision maker, being unobservable. For this reason, much risk measurement work has been conducted in the lab. This raises two interrelated questions. First, to what degree do choices made in the lab reflect choices that are made outside of the lab? Second, how do specific payoff procedures used in the lab affect risk taking behavior? This paper uses data from the field and three separate lab treatments to provide further empirical evidence for answering these two questions.
Specifically, we exploit a promotional campaign conducted by a bank that offered potential customers a chance to receive up to 1,000 € to gauge risk attitudes in the field. We then design an experiment that closely mimics the bank promotion to compare individual's risk taking decisions between the two settings.
One drawback to the bank data is the coarseness of information that it provides. This is due to the structure of the choice that decision makers faced in the field: a single binary choice between a certain payment and a risky lottery. Hence, one can only draw inferences that a person is more or less risk averse than a given threshold. This contrasts with the approach of most laboratory experiments, where the objective is to capture a more precise degree of risk aversion. By presenting a subject with several choices, a finer partitioning of a respondent's risk attitude is possible. However, having a respondent make multiple decisions necessitates a design choice by the researcher. If multiple choices are used to determine payment then potential wealth effects are introduced under the assumptions of expected utility theory. For this reason, researchers instead frequently select one task at random for payment, as in the popular multiple price list approach in Holt and Laury (2002) . While some researchers have provided evidence to suggest that this random payment procedure does not alter behavior (e.g. Cubitt et al. 1998 and Starmer and Sugden 1991), Holt (1986) and Cox et al. (2015) argue that this technique is not incentive compatible if the independence axiom does not hold and can affect behavior. To provide further empirical evidence on the degree to which presenting subjects multiple tasks, one of which is selected at random for payment, impacts risk taking behavior, we introduce a second laboratory treatment. Here a subject faces the same choice as faced by the bank customers plus four other choices using a similar structure, but with only one choice randomly selected for payment.
Finally, we include a third experimental treatment that examines how another common payment technique impacts risk taking behavior. Rather than paying each participant, some researchers randomly select a subset of respondents to actually receive payment (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1981, Langer and Weber 2008). Such procedures are typically accompanied by a statement reminding the participant that her choices might determine her payment and therefore it is in her best interest to respond as if they will. This approach allows a researcher to collect more observations or increases the nominal stakes for the same expected cost.
Ultimately, we find that the laboratory subjects in all three treatments make nearly identical decisions. Further, the observed behavior is similar between the lab and the field controlling for the age and gender of the decision maker. These findings suggest that, at least in this case, lab experiments provide a reasonable degree of external validity and that behavior is robust to the payoff procedures.
Risk Data from the Field
A private bank in the Slovak Republic conducted a marketing promotion to attract new clients.
Individuals, who had a minimum of 1,000 € could open a savings account to which the bank would add either a fixed amount of 20 € or a randomly determined amount. To make the decision to take the safe or risky payment, a person went to the bank's website where the official rules were available and logged in into her account. Each customer would click a button associated with her preferred choice. If the person chose to "Roll the Die," an image of a die rolled across the screen with each face displaying one of the six possible prize amounts. The award amount was instantly reflected in the account balance, but to receive the money a person had to keep a minimum balance of 1,000 € excluding the award in the new account for 3 months.
The critical feature of this campaign is that the distribution for the risky payment was available to the decision makers. This distribution, shown in Table 1 Figure 1 plots the percentage of males and females who opted for the risky payment by age. The size of the marker indicates the proportion of the data accounted for by a particular age and gender combination. Based on Figure 1 , it appears that there is no gender difference in the behavior of the bank customers, but behavior does appear to vary with age, as older people are less willing to take the risky option.
[Insert Figure 1 ] These demographic conclusions are supported econometrically in Table 2 , which reports the results of estimating a probit model controlling for gender, age, and an interaction between the two. The dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the person opted to "Roll the Die" and accept the risky payment. Otherwise, it is 0. The coefficient on age is negative and significant while the coefficient on gender is not statistically significant.
Risk Data from the Lab

Experimental Design
Data were collected from 162 people in three between-subject treatments. The first, which is referred to as the Baseline, was designed to match the bank promotion as closely as possible.
The other two treatments are designed to evaluate the effect of two common payment procedures used in laboratory experiments. Referred to as "Pay Random Task" and "Pay Random Subject", these treatments are explained in detail below.
The experiments were conducted in the Economic Laboratory at the University of Economics in Bratislava. Participants were primarily students (62%), but some were university staff (mainly administrative staff) and others were from the general public. an account were invited to participate in the experiment, but the questionnaire also contained other distraction questions and the respondents were not aware of this selection criteria.
Recruitment for the lab experiment was done in a similar fashion to that done in the bank's marketing campaign: leaflets, mass email and a Facebook advertisement.
In the Baseline, subjects read "rules" that mirrored those of the bank promotion (English translations of the bank promotion rules and the experimental instructions are included in the appendix while copies in the original Slovak are available upon request). The choice problem was the same in terms of stakes and probabilities. The visual presentation of the task and the manner of providing information regarding the distribution for the risky payment were virtually identical. The one difference is that subjects in the laboratory were not required to actually open an account and wait three months for the payment. Instead, they were paid in cash at the conclusion of the experiment.
The Pay Random Task treatment differed from the Baseline in that subjects made five different choices including the one in Table 1 . The five choices were presented in a randomly determined order and only one of these choices was used to determine the subjects' payment. For the first task, subjects observed the full set of rules, but on subsequent tasks, only the changes (i.e. the relevant distribution) were presented. Ultimately, neither CRT score nor responses to the hypothetical investment question were found to significantly correlate with risk taking behavior. 4 Table 3 provides summary statistics for each of the three experimental conditions as well as the field data. Clearly, the laboratory subjects tended to be younger than the respondents in the field and a slightly higher percentage of lab participants were female.
Experimental Results
[Insert Table 3] First, we compare behavior across the three experimental treatments by probit regression controlling for age and gender. We conclude that in this case behavior was the same in the one shot baseline as in the Pay Random Task treatment and the Pay One Subject treatment (see Model 1 in Table 4 ). This is formalized in Finding 1. We further note that we do not find any gender or age differences between the treatments. [Insert Table 4 ] Table 4 also reports probit regressions comparing the decision to "Roll the Die" across the two data sources: lab and field. The explanatory variable Lab takes the value 1 if the decision was made in the lab and is 0 otherwise. For lab and field comparison, we tested three models. In Model 2, only data from the Baseline is included in the analysis to provide the most direct comparison of the lab and the field. As we have not found any effect of the payment procedure on risk taking (Finding 1), Model 3 includes the combined data from all three lab conditions.
The statistical analysis reveals that, controlling for gender and age, behavior is similar in the lab and field. 
Conclusions
Exploiting a bank promotion that presented people with a risky choice, we develop a laboratory The argument made in the book is that researchers have not made much real progress in this arena and that expected utility theory and other common parametric models do a poor job of explaining observed behavior. In support of this view, Trautmann (2016, p. 178) notes that he is "not aware of any robustly replicated effects of risk attitude measures on risky behaviors outside the lab". Our paper cannot speak to the success of expected utility theory vis-a-vis other models or to the consistency of a person's behavior across tasks or domains. However, our work does suggest that aggregate level behavior is robust, at least on this particular task, across payment techniques in the lab and between the lab and the field. Which alternative do you choose? 9. Suppose that you earned 100 000 EUR in lottery winnings. How much of the 100 000 EUR would you be willing to invest in an asset to either HALVE or DOUBLE in two years time with equal probability?
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10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100 10. A bat and a ball cost 1.10 EUR in total. The bat costs 1.00 EUR more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?
11. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
12. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? [
END TREATMENTS]
The experimenter therefore makes the following conditions of competition. Just to make sure that we are speaking the same language: words beginning with capital letters have the meaning which we assigned to them in these competition conditions. e) 100 EUR with the probability of 2% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[GAME B]
2.3 If the Winner chose the possibility to win amount from 10 EUR (in words: ten euro) up to 1 000 EUR (in words: one thousand euro) according to the result of the virtual rolling of the die, his/her Winnings in the Competition will be: a) 10 EUR with the probability of 34% b) 20 EUR with the probability of 49% c) 30 EUR with the probability of 12% d) 50 EUR with the probability of 3% e) 100 EUR with the probability of 2% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[GAME C] 2.3 If the Winner chose the possibility to win amount from 10 EUR (in words: ten euro) up to 1 000 EUR (in words: one thousand euro) according to the result of the virtual rolling of the die, his/her Winnings in the Competition will be: a) 10 EUR with the probability of 50% b) 20 EUR with the probability of 39% c) 30 EUR with the probability of 5% d) 50 EUR with the probability of 3% e) 100 EUR with the probability of 2% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[GAME D] e) 100 EUR with the probability of 2% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[GAME E] e) 100 EUR with the probability of 0% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[ e) 100 EUR with the probability of 2% f) 1 000 EUR with a probability of 1%.
[END TREATMENTS]
2.4 The Winnings is an income from capital funds and therefore it is a subject to 19% income tax withholding. Tax liability is the responsibility of the Winner.
TERMINATION OF WINNING CLAIM
3.1 If it is found than even one of the Conditions is not fulfilled, the Winner's claim under the paragraph 2.1 will be terminated. In Bratislava, 1st October 2015 A Behavior reported here is based on the choice shown in Table 1 , which is the same choice as in the other treatments.
B Average CRT Score is the average number of correctly answered CRT questions.
C Average investment is measured with the hypothetical risky investment question from the SOEP. Dependent variable is binary and equals to 1 if the person opted to "Roll the Die" and accept the risky payment. Otherwise, it is 0. Standard errors are in parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
We conducted a prior hypothesis power analysis for testing the difference between independent samples using GPower 3.1 Software. Given our sample sizes, our empirical approach has a power of at least 80% for identifying a treatment effect of 0.15 in the difference between proportions of risk taking in comparisons between data sets. Age group Female Male
